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ABSTRACT 
 The Joint Kill Chain Event (JKCE), designed by the Air Force’s Distributed 
Mission Operations Center (DMOC), provides an interesting case study for evaluation of 
simulated military training.  JKCE places Army Air Defense Artillery Fire Control 
Officers (ADAFCOs) into an Air Force Control and Reporting Center (CRC) simulator.  
From the CRC, the ADAFCO leads an air missile defense scenario, protecting friendly 
assets (airfields, bases, missile launchers, etc.) and coordinating surface-to-air missile 
strikes.   This scenario serves as the operational capstone event in the Army’s ADAFCO 
certification course, which qualifies officers to perform a vital missile authorization 
function in major combat operations. 
 The current course configuration consists of two weeks of classroom-based 
academics followed by one week of simulator practice and testing.  The didactic portion 
of the course is designed to teach the students those skills required of an operational 
ADAFCO.  The simulator-based portion of the course, JKCE, tests those new skills in a 
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simulated operational environment.  However, this analysis reveals major testing 
inconsistencies and statistically significant practice effects during JKCE.  Additionally, 
the didactic portion of the course proved incapable of generating the desired operational 
result, successful completion of JKCE.  
Changes to the structure and implementation of JKCE could improve this 
program, by shifting focus toward desired outcomes.  In this thesis, I develop relevant 
performance metrics for JKCE, capture and analyze those metrics, and finally provide 
recommendations for course improvement, based on empirical evidence and program 
evaluation best practices. 
 
  
v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 3 
Cost Considerations ................................................................................................ 3 
Simulator Fidelity ................................................................................................... 6 
Pilot Utility and Welfare Maximization ................................................................. 8 
Operator Acceptance ............................................................................................... 9 
Improved DMO Evaluation .................................................................................. 11 
Experimental Design ............................................................................................. 11 
CASE STUDY MOTIVATION ....................................................................................... 13 
ADAFCO Responsibilities and Training .............................................................. 16 
ADAFCO Course .................................................................................................. 17 
The DMOC and JKCE .......................................................................................... 18 
JKCE Schedule ..................................................................................................... 19 
Scenario Overview ................................................................................................ 20 
Simulated vs. Live JKCE ...................................................................................... 22 
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 26 
Performance Metrics ............................................................................................. 26 
Four Level Analysis .............................................................................................. 28 
Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 29 
Preliminary Experimental Design (JKCE 12-1) ................................................... 31 
vi 
 
 
RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 33 
Preliminary Results (JKCE 12-1) ......................................................................... 33 
Preliminary Observations (JKCE 12-1) ................................................................ 34 
Secondary Analysis (JKCE 12-2) ......................................................................... 36 
Course Configuration ............................................................................................ 41 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 45 
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... 47 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 48 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. 50 
Appendix A: JKCE 12-1 Collected Data .............................................................. 51 
Appendix B: JKCE 12-2 Collected Data .............................................................. 52 
Appendix C: Reaction Times ................................................................................ 53 
Appendix D: Equations and Test Statistics ........................................................... 54 
  
  
  
vii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: ADAFCO Organizational Structure .................................................................. 16 
Figure 2: JKCE Scenario .................................................................................................. 21 
Equation 1: Regression Model .......................................................................................... 37 
Equation 2: Hypothesis Test ............................................................................................. 40 
 
  
viii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: JKCE 12-1 Experimental Design........................................................................ 32 
Table 2: JKCE 12-1 Reaction Times ................................................................................ 34 
Table 3: JKCE 12-2 Experimental Design........................................................................ 36 
Table 4: JKCE 12-2 Reaction Times ................................................................................ 37 
Table 5: Regression Analysis............................................................................................ 38 
Table 6: JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 Record Run Reaction Times ............................................. 38 
Table 7: All Practice and Record Run Reaction Times .................................................... 39 
Table 8: Test Statistics ...................................................................................................... 40 
Table 9: Course Reconfiguration 2x2 Factorial Design ................................................... 43 
  
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In upcoming years the Department of Defense is expected to face a series of deep 
budget cuts, like many other federal agencies.  As a result of the 2011 Budget Control 
Act, the Department of Defense will reduce spending by “approximately $487 billion 
over the next decade or $259 billion over the next five years” (Department of Defense, 
2012, p. 1).  The cause is a combination of the end of the War in Iraq and drawdown of 
troops from the War in Afghanistan, coupled with slow economic growth.  A stagnant 
economy produces relatively less tax revenues, which provide the funding base for 
federal programs like those in the Department of Defense.  The military’s reaction has 
been a scramble to prioritize funding and preserve war-fighting capabilities.   
Training expenditures are an area where the military could potentially save money 
by leveraging technological advancements.  Military operators require a significant 
amount of specialized training on sophisticated equipment, which can be expensive.  
Deciding that training is too costly and then producing lower-skilled operators is not an 
acceptable alternative.  The military’s goal is to provide the same product, highly skilled 
operators, for less money by exploiting previously unrealized efficiencies.  One way the 
Department of Defense seeks to achieve this goal is through increased use of modeling 
and simulation.  As fuel, maintenance, and weapons system procurement costs rise, 
simulated training becomes more appealing compared to its live counterpart.  From a cost 
effectiveness standpoint, modeling and simulation appears favorable to live forms of 
training. 
Simulators provide an artificial environment for training, testing, and 
experimentation.  The term simulator, as used in the military today, appeared shortly after 
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the world’s first aircraft about a hundred years ago.  At that time a simulator was nothing 
more than a stationary aircraft cockpit used to practice basic procedures, which provided 
zero user feedback.  While simulator-based military training started with aircraft pilots, it 
later spread throughout the Department of Defense. 
Today, computer-based simulators are used to train nearly every form of military 
operator, i.e., those members of the armed services who are directly engaged in the act of 
warfare.  Though the technology and complexity of military simulation has evolved, the 
premise remains unchanged: simulators exist to reduce the cost of training.  These costs 
take many forms; including land, fuel, maintenance, ordnance, time, negative 
externalities, and even human lives.  The military uses simulated training exercises to 
lower the cost of training and maintain a force of combat-capable operators. 
Aside from high costs, a problem is prevalent in both live and simulated military 
training.  Both forms, live and virtual, typically do not link training metrics to desired 
operational outcomes.  In many cases, operationally relevant training metrics are not 
captured whatsoever.  This is one reason why the question of simulated versus live 
training is commonly approached with a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).   
Military leaders prefer less-costly training, assuming constant effects across the 
potential alternatives.  However, there is a more fundamental question than which 
alternative is cheapest.  That question is, does the training program, live or simulated, 
actually create or improve operational war-fighting skills?  To execute a CEA, one must 
first establish some measure of the training effect.  Military training programs should be 
justified by quantifiable results, in the form of operationally relevant skills. 
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BACKGROUND 
Returning to the original objective, the military wants to deliver the same product, 
highly trained operators, at lower cost.  One way to achieve this is by shifting training 
away from the live environment toward simulators in Distributed Mission Operations 
(DMO).  However, this approach relies on the assumption that simulator training can 
effectively replace at least some live training requirements.  This section provides an 
overview of the simulated military training literature with an emphasis on effects-based 
analyses. 
 
Cost Considerations 
As fuel, maintenance, and procurement costs rise, simulated training through 
DMO becomes relatively more appealing compared to its live counterpart.  While 
simulators still have procurement and maintenance costs, in general these costs are orders 
of magnitude cheaper than their live counterparts.   
Military equipment, for example planes and tanks, depreciates with use.  
Therefore an opportunity cost is associated with using this equipment for training, 
because theoretically this use causes equipment depreciation.  Usage can shorten the 
equipment’s lifecycle and increase maintenance costs.  Again this is a benefit of 
simulation; military leaders are able to save equipment for its intended purpose, which is 
actual combat.   
Aside from these strictly financial concerns, there are additional social costs to 
consider.  Training with live military equipment may create significant negative 
externalities.  Some examples include: noise pollution from aircraft and other heavy 
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equipment, environmental pollution from vehicle exhaust or weapon tests, civilian 
property damage and or loss of life from training accidents.  Simulation enables the 
military to avoid these social costs typically attributed to training programs.   
Costs aside, sometimes live training is simply not feasible due to safety 
regulations and or test range limitations.  Military test ranges are slowly disappearing as a 
result of population growth and increased environmental concerns.  For instance, if the 
military wanted to test a new nuclear weapon it is unlikely that they would be able to use 
the ranges of Nevada, which was once commonplace.  Again, simulation is unaffected by 
these constraints. 
 
Basic Simulator Effectiveness Studies 
When analyzing military training, distinguishing between live and simulated 
training can be difficult.  Schank et al. (2002) distinguish between the two, saying “live 
training implies the exercise of the operational platform while simulated training suggests 
the operational platform is not exercised but rather is replaced by another device” (p. 47).  
Put simply, “live” implies that the operator is using the actual weapon system, for 
example an airplane or a tank.  Simulators on the other hand are typically computer-based 
systems that emulate those live assets.   
Jacobs et al. (1990) performed a meta-analysis of 26 experiments on simulated 
training, finding that simulated training combined with live training improved 
performance of basic flight procedures when compared to live aircraft training alone.  
This report establishes that simulator training can improve operators’ skills. The finding 
is important; however, it should not be surprising.  One expects that additional training, 
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whether it occurs in the aircraft or simulator, would improve performance.  However, the 
report is unable to offer any help in comparing live and virtual training effectiveness.  
Additionally, the authors promote the use of simulators as a supplement to live training 
rather than a replacement. 
Bell and Waag (1998) were able to increase the scope of the virtual training 
analysis beyond basic flight procedures.  They concluded that technological 
improvements have expanded the actual and potential usages of simulators in training 
(Bell & Waag, 1998, p. 232).  The study demonstrated that military operators and 
policymakers were becoming more open-minded about the applications of simulated 
training.  Finally, although they do not provide empirical evidence, they believe that 
simulation technology has reached the point necessary to effectively train combat-
oriented skills (Bell & Waag, 1998, p. 232).  It is important to remember that creating and 
developing combat skills is the fundamental goal of military training programs.  
Distributed Mission Operations (DMO) takes the idea of standalone simulators to 
the next level by integrating multiple systems over a network.  DMO requires linking 
multiple simulators in a common virtual environment, which allows multiple operators 
from different weapon systems to train together.  The appeal is clear; these once stand-
alone simulators can now be integrated into more complex training events.  These 
simulated training events allow operators to not only practice individual skills, but also 
learn how their actions fit into the larger war-fighting system.  Trainees can practice the 
communication and coordination skills that are also crucial in combat operations.  
The Air Force conducted an all-virtual training exercise called RoadRunner 98 
with the goal of assessing the training potential of DMO, previously known as 
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Distributed Mission Training.  Crane et al. (2000) provided the first-ever DMO 
effectiveness analysis and concluded “technologies are capable of providing effective, 
warfighter training in simulation that complement aircraft training” (p. 45).  However, 
this assessment, like the others discussed up to this point, was based entirely on 
subjective analysis.  There was no detailed investigation of operationally relevant 
performance metrics.  Essentially, the contribution is that the basic training effectiveness 
results attributed to simulators generally carry over to combat-oriented tasks exercised in 
DMO.  An interesting take away from this study is that the writers still regarded DMO 
and simulation as a complement rather than a replacement for live training. 
 
Simulator Fidelity 
The literature discussed up until this point has advocated simulation and DMO as 
supplements to a live training regimen for high-risk and infeasible training events 
(Schank et al., 2006, p. 53).  The intent of the first flight simulators was to facilitate task 
familiarization through repetition.  For instance, new pilots use the simulator to practice 
landing procedures and radio calls.  
 The argument for DMO as a live training replacement comes down to the issue of 
fidelity.  In this context, fidelity refers to the degree to which the simulation replicates the 
live environment.  For an aircraft simulator, fidelity can mean the cockpit configuration, 
equipment behavior, and environmental characteristics of the virtual environment, to 
name a few.  Military policymakers and simulator designers assume that operators want a 
simulator that looks, feels, and acts like the asset it is emulating. 
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 The logic of the simulation fidelity argument is simple.  Live training more 
closely resembles live war-fighting; therefore live training must be more effective than 
simulated training.  When comparing identical training events, one virtual and one live, 
the prevailing assumption is that the live event better prepares operators for combat.  
Likewise, a higher-fidelity simulator is preferred to a lower-fidelity simulator.  This 
argument is intuitively appealing, but to this writer’s knowledge there has never been a 
pure simulator versus live training effectiveness study.  Additionally, both simulated and 
live training share a common dilemma, they are not always supported by studies that link 
training to tangible improvements in combat skills.  The burden of demonstrating training 
effectiveness falls on live and simulated programs alike.   
The difficulty of providing a high-fidelity simulator varies greatly across weapons 
systems.  For example, consider the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).  
AWACS is essentially a radar control tower that exists on an aircraft.  The cabin of the 
aircraft is filled with rows of computer workstations, rather than seating as in a traditional 
passenger aircraft.  Typically, a four-person crew consisting of two pilots, a navigator and 
a flight engineer flies the plane.  The other twenty or so personnel on the plane work at 
computer stations tracking and directing other aircraft.  For these workstation operators, 
simulator fidelity is relatively easy to achieve, because one only has to replicate voice, 
data links, and radar traffic.  However, accurately simulating the in-flight behavior of the 
plane is a much more challenging problem.  Rather than train the entire crew together, 
separating the aircrew from the radar operators simplifies the fidelity problem.   
Schank et al. (2002) analyzed simulator effectiveness across a few different 
weapon systems.  The researchers examined three United States Navy weapon systems 
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including a fighter aircraft called the F/A-18, an anti-submarine and radar aircraft called 
the P-3C, and a ship called DDG-51 destroyer (2002, p. iii).  One of the major finding is 
that “simulators are used more often for events that involve the analysis of input data” 
and “used least often for events that attempt to replicate situational or environmental 
conditions” (2002, p. 46).  This can be demonstrated in the context of the AWACS 
system operator and the fighter pilot.  It is much easier to simulate the AWACS 
operator’s computer-based equipment than the physical behavior of a fighter jet. 
Unlike the AWACS, transitioning fighter aircraft toward increased use of 
simulation is difficult, because pilots’ performance is so dependent on physical effects, 
such as high-speed maneuvering and G-force management.  These effects are very 
difficult if not impossible to accurately simulate, thus in that sense simulator fidelity must 
increase until it can benefit fighter pilot training (Schank, 2002, p. 49). 
 
Pilot Utility and Welfare Maximization 
The fighter pilot is an interesting example to discuss within the context of a 
welfare maximization problem.  There is a possibility that fighter pilots dislike simulator-
based training, due to inadequate simulator fidelity, and that a shift from live to virtual 
training could cause a reduction in operator utility.  The theoretical benevolent social 
planner would be interested in this utility reduction when calculating the cost portion of a 
cost-benefit analysis.   
However, the fact that these individuals are military members bound to the lawful 
orders of their superiors simplifies the problem.  While service-members’ utility is an 
important concern, it should be considered lower in weight than military readiness.  
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Command structure aside, this issue should be argued on the grounds of training 
effectiveness and not operator utility. 
From an economist’s perspective, military training programs are evaluated on 
their ability to create or improve operational capabilities and cost.  If the simulator-based 
training is cheaper and creates the same or better operational outcomes than live training, 
then the pilots would have no justification for complaint.  Program effectiveness trumps 
operator utility when evaluating training alternatives. 
However, recent literature suggests that simulator training is achieving higher 
levels of operator acceptance, even among fighter pilots.  To clarify, the term operator 
acceptance refers to a subjective estimation of training effectiveness from the operator’s 
perspective. 
 
Operator Acceptance 
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) hosted a DMO-based training 
program in 2006 with the goal of quantifying training effectiveness.  As part of their 
research, the writers carried out an extensive survey process, aimed at the event’s 
participants, F-16 fighter pilots and AWACS radar controllers.  These operators 
participated in a weeklong training program and post-course survey.  In their post-course 
survey, 49 of 50 AWACS controllers and 311 of 327 fighter pilots revealed that they 
would recommend this training event to fellow operators (Schreiber, Rowe, & Bennett, 
2006, p. 18). 
The overwhelming support demonstrated by operators for this DMO event is a 
milestone for simulated training.  As Schrieber, Rowe, and Bennett conclude, “user 
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opinion does not bestow an adequate measure of training success or effectiveness, but it 
can establish user acceptance, which is often necessary condition for continued system 
use” (2006, p. 1).  This support suggests that, in the eyes of the operators, simulation 
fidelity has reached an adequate level of fidelity. 
Fidelity is important to operator acceptance of simulated training, with the 
assumption that more is better.  Considering most military decision makers are or were 
operators, fidelity will likely remain a simulation focal point.  However, improving 
fidelity is not the underlying purpose of virtual training. 
The goal of military training is improving operational performance, which does 
not necessarily require high-fidelity simulations.  Salas, Bowers, and Milham state 
“fidelity, however, is not the only component of effective training” but rather “the ability 
of trainees to perform trained behaviors in operational settings” (2003, p. 4-5, 13).  They 
maintain that increasing operational performance may or may not necessitate higher-
fidelity simulators.  Schreiber and Bennett reinforce this point, saying the “DMO training 
environments exist first and foremost to improve warfighter competence, not necessarily 
to create the most realistic environment as an end unto itself” (2006, p. 4).  Military 
decision makers must concentrate on training effectiveness, which may or may not 
require improved simulator fidelity.   
The literature in this section, particularly AFRL’s survey results, suggests that 
simulation fidelity is improving, and as a result so is operator approval.  Unfortunately, 
increased simulation fidelity and even operator acceptance is not the underlying goal.  
Improving operational performance is the purpose of any legitimate military training 
program, regardless of whether or not it occurs in a DMO environment. 
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Improved DMO Evaluation 
 The AFRL study from 2006 was the first to gather task-oriented performance data 
from a DMO event.  As previously stated, they conducted a weeklong training course for 
F-16 pilots and AWACS operators.  The course structure was as follows.  The pilots: 
Received some simulator familiarization training and then were immediately 
benchmarked, or tested on their pre-training point defense scenario performance.  
Post-training reassessment with those same pilots using mirror-image point 
defense scenario benchmarks occurred at the completion of five-day DMO 
training.  (Schreiber & Bennett, 2006, p. 5)   
The researchers demonstrate that DMO training can have a significant positive 
effect on simulated performance.  They provide statistically significant evidence that the 
DMO training program improved operator competency.  This is an important step toward 
quantifying operational improvement as the result of simulated training. 
This study represents an exception to the standard military training evaluation, 
because it was able to demonstrate tangible training benefits.  However, the overarching 
problem with this study is that the analysis cannot reach into the operational realm.  The 
results are relevant, but do not answer the question, does this training improve war-
fighting performance?  Once again, this is not uniquely a DMO problem, but rather a 
problem in evaluating any military training program.  
 
Experimental Design 
The literature discussed above suggests that simulated training in addition to live 
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training improves live performance.  Additionally, the AFRL DMO study demonstrated 
that simulator training can significantly increase performance in the simulator.  However, 
“transfer of skill from simulation to the operational environments has not been 
established” (Salas, Bowers, & Milham, 2003, p. 13).  Schreiber and Bennett (2006) 
stress that “application-oriented studies must also be undertaken, such as what is the 
degree of transfer to a live-fly training event” (p. 21).  Schank (2006) suggests the 
following setup to investigate the transfer of skills from the simulator to the live 
environment: 
Such experimental studies would involve setting up two groups to accomplish 
specific training objectives.  One group would use simulators; the other would use 
live training.  The performance of the two groups along several dimensions would 
then be measured and compared to understand the impact of the two methods of 
training. (p. 44). 
No one has ever conducted this type of experiment for military training, because 
of its difficulty and cost.  However, even this explanation assumes a considerable amount 
of difference between the simulated and live environment.  When evaluating JKCE, the 
high level of simulator fidelity makes such an experiment unnecessary.  Additionally, 
replicating JKCE in a live environment is unrealistic for multiple reasons discussed later 
in this paper.    
13 
 
 
CASE STUDY MOTIVATION 
 This section begins with background on the Phased Array TRacking Intercept of 
Target (PATRIOT) weapon system and its performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).  Next, the discussion shifts toward the purpose and training of the U.S. Army’s Air 
Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers (ADAFCOs).  This leads into justification for the 
development and implementation of JKCE as an operational capstone event in the 
Army’s formal ADAFCO training course.  The section concludes by explaining why a 
simulation-based JKCE is preferred to theoretical live training alternative. 
The PATRIOT is a surface-to-air missile system designed to defend military 
assets (personnel, bases, equipment, etc.) against enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and 
tactical ballistic missiles (United States Army).  Surface-to-air simply means that the 
PATRIOT missile launches from the ground and targets airborne assets, i.e. planes or 
other missiles.  Basically, the system protects friendly assets from airborne threats. 
Despite its longstanding and successful relationship with the Army, the PATRIOT 
missile defense system received significant negative attention in the early months of the 
War in Iraq.  The PATRIOT weapons system was involved in two fratricide incidents, 
which killed three friendly aircrew members (Hawley, 2007, p.1).  Two different friendly 
aircraft were misclassified as enemy missiles, then subsequently shot and destroyed.  The 
PATRIOT system was employed eleven times during OIF, and every engagement 
resulted in successful destruction of the target.  Unfortunately, two of those targets were 
misclassified friendly aircraft.  Within the first few months of the Iraq War the PATRIOT 
missile system committed fratricide in eighteen percent of its engagements, an 
unacceptable statistic by American military standards.   
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The Defense Science Board, by direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, formed a Task Force to investigate PATRIOT 
system performance.  Between August 2003 and June 2004, the Task Force investigated 
the two incidents, as well as the training and employment procedures related to the 
PATRIOT system (Williams & Delaney, 2005, p. 1). 
 The Task Force attributed the fratricide incidents to three major shortfalls: poor 
performance of the identification friend or foe (IFF) system, insufficient situational 
awareness across the members of the joint air defense system, and overly automated 
PATRIOT operating procedures.  Subsequently, the Task Force provided 
recommendations addressing each shortfall. 
 The first shortfall was that the “combat identification capability embodied in the 
Mode IV IFF system performed very poorly” (Williams & Delaney, 2005, p. 2).  
Avoiding unnecessary technical details, the Mode IV IFF system on an aircraft sends an 
electronic signal that identifies itself as a friendly, i.e. “don’t shoot me”.  This system 
obviously did not work properly during the fratricide incidents.  However, given the 
sheer number of PATRIOT to friendly aircraft interactions, outside of defensive 
engagements, “even very-low probability failures could result in regrettable fratricide 
incidents” (Williams & Delaney, 2005, p. 2).  The PATRIOT’s radar will pick up 
anything airborne within its range, so if the system is located near an airfield, then there 
is a significant amount of activity.  Moreover, there is a large amount of friendly air 
traffic in the beginning stages of a war, when there are still a high number of supply 
shipments and offensive strikes.  Not surprisingly, the Task Force’s recommendation was 
to “find and fix Mode IV IFF problems” (Williams & Delaney, 2005, p. 3). 
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 The next shortfall was the lack of situational awareness, directed at the air missile 
defense system and command and control infrastructure in general.  Command and 
control, as defined by Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms (2012), is “the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment 
of the mission” (p. 59).  This term describes the centralized control of decentralized 
assets within a particular area of responsibility.   
William and Delaney (2005) summarize the problem by saying “we tend to 
assume that data are routinely communicated from one system to the other, that targets 
are correlated, and target information is shared and assimilated by all” (p. 2).  Even 
without IFF, the command and control structure should be robust enough to correctly 
identify and categorize friendly aircraft.  The problem is that this structure is not failsafe, 
because the military has a significant amount of aircraft tracking equipment that is not 
necessarily perfectly integrated.  The fact that a friendly aircraft properly displays on one 
radar or data link system does not mean that it properly appears on every system.    
 The third and final shortfall was that the PATRIOT crews’ protocol became too 
automatic and dependent on the system.  This is what Hawley (2007) defines as 
automation bias or an “unwarranted over-reliance on automation” (p. 4).  The Task Force 
recommended that the Army develop “a protocol that allows more operator oversight and 
control of major system actions” (Williams & Delaney, 2005, p. 3).  In essence, the Task 
Force wanted to inject human reasoning into the launch decision, rather than placing one 
hundred percent trust in the equipment. 
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 Two of the aforementioned shortfalls directly apply to the employment of the 
PATRIOT weapon system.  First, communication across the aircraft command and 
control infrastructure needs improvement.  Second, PATRIOT operators need to move 
away from their “trust the system” mentality.  PATRIOT operational protocol needs 
increased human interaction and verification.   One way the Army sought to implement 
these recommendations was with a reinvigoration of the ADAFCO position. 
 
ADAFCO Responsibilities and Training 
The ADAFCO acts as the upper-level approval authority for PATRIOT missile 
launches in an operational environment.  Each ADAFCO can direct multiple PATRIOT 
battalions, which in turn direct multiple PATRIOT batteries.  Figure 1 below provides an 
example of the basic organizational structure.  Put simply, the ADAFCO is responsible 
for giving the “engage” order, which results in an interceptive PATRIOT launch against 
Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs), Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), cruise missiles, or 
enemy aircraft.  
 
Figure 1: ADAFCO Organizational Structure 
The ADAFCO is somewhat unique in that he or she operates within a joint 
command and control platform, that is, with the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or any 
combination thereof.  Although the Department of Defense is responsible for all branches 
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of the military, the integration of their personnel and equipment is by no means a trivial 
task.  Each branch operates somewhat differently, and in wartime these differences can 
reduce operational effectiveness or worse, lead to friendly or civilian casualties.  The 
Army designated the ADAFCO position to bridge the intra-service gaps with the Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
Some examples of the joint platforms that the ADAFCOs can operate within 
include; the Marine Corps’s Tactical Air Operation Center, and the Air Force’s AWACS, 
Control and Reporting Center (CRC), and Battlespace Command and Control Center.  
The ADAFCO integrates into the crew of one of the above command and control stations 
and acts as their PATRIOT liaison.  Not only is the ADAFCO a system expert, but also 
he or she is the missile firing authority for the PATRIOT battalions.  This setup ensures 
coordination of the individual PATRIOT batteries and provides a direct line of 
communication to the overarching joint command and control authority.   
 
ADAFCO Course 
In response to the Defense Science Board’s recommendations, the Army 
“launched the development of a structured Army Air Defense Artillery Control Officer 
(ADAFCO) training school resulting in major changes to the USA Air Defense Artillery 
(ADA’s) Training and Standard Operating Procedures (TSOP)” (Cavanagh, 2011, p. 1).  
The resultant course is three weeks in length and based on nine training objectives.  For 
assessments, the course contains two written examinations and a DMO-based operational 
test known as JKCE.  JKCE stems from the course objectives to familiarize the 
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ADAFCOs with the command and control agencies from which they will operate and 
execute joint kill chain operations (Lybarger, 2008).   
 
The DMOC and JKCE 
A tri-service working group congregated to implement the recommendations of 
the Defense Science Board Task Force.  The working group concluded the Air Force’s 
CRC would be the ideal location for the ADAFCO to prevent future PATRIOT-related 
fratricide incidents (Cavanagh, 2011, p. 1).  Additionally, the CRC is the most-likely 
command and control system to be deployed in a wartime environment (Maule, 2010).  In 
short, the creators of JKCE focused their efforts on the CRC, because it was the most 
frequently used platform in a deployed environment and best potential counter-fratricide 
system.  
In addition to being a suitable counter-fratricide node and highly utilized system 
during deployments, the physical structure of the CRC van promotes a high-level of 
scenario fidelity.  The simulator possesses the same hardware, software, and functionality 
of its live counterpart.  Because the CRC is essentially a hardened windowless trailer, 
there is negligible difference between the live and simulated environment.  To the CRC 
crew and ADAFCO, the scenario appears as it would in the real world.  The system 
behavior and observable features are consistent with live operations.  Because the CRC 
van does not have to move or even interact with its physical surroundings, the scenario 
designers avoid the typical fidelity issues associated with many other tasks, such as flight 
simulation.  This relatively high level of fidelity blurs the line between live and simulated 
training, which is one reason why the JKCE presents such an interesting case study.   
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With the CRC in mind, the ADA school approached the DMOC to develop and 
execute the first-ever JKCE in June of 2006.  Since the event’s inception, the DMOC has 
hosted two JKCEs per year, typically every January and August.  The ADA school chose 
the DMOC not only for its CRC simulator, but because the DMOC is an Air Force DMO 
center of excellence.  The DMOC designs, executes, and supports a variety of DMO test, 
training, and experimentation events.   
JKCE consists of much more than just the CRC; constructive simulators are 
necessary to render the friendly aircraft, enemy aircraft, enemy missiles and enemy 
missile sites.  Simulated PATRIOT battalions and radio capabilities are also necessary.  
The DMOC is able to provide these capabilities, as well as the expertise to design virtual 
combat scenarios while adhering to customer requirements.  
From 2006 through 2009, an Army base in Texas called Fort Bliss provided the 
PATRIOT capability for the exercise.  Because of this, JKCE was a two-site DMO event 
with the CRC simulator and constructive simulators located at the DMOC on Kirtland 
Air Force Base, and the PATRIOT simulator at Fort Bliss.  In 2010, the DMOC expanded 
its support with the addition of a PATRIOT emulator.  The entire ADAFCO course 
moved to the DMOC, which created savings by eliminating unnecessary travel costs and 
reducing the amount of simulator integration. 
 
JKCE Schedule 
 As previously stated, the entire ADAFCO course lasts three weeks, with two 
weeks of classroom learning and the week of simulator practice and testing, otherwise 
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known as the JKCE.  The JKCE itself is also broken into three parts: simulator 
familiarization, practice runs, and record runs.  
On the simulator familiarization day, the CRC crews and ADAFCOs observe the 
simulators and learn about the scenario and their performance objectives.  During the 
next two days, each ADAFCO gets a one-hour practice run in the CRC.  The course 
instructors do not grade these practice runs, and in past JKCEs the engineers at the 
DMOC had not recorded these runs either (until JKCE 12-2).   
Finally, during the last two days each ADAFCO gets a single record run.  The 
instructors grade the record runs on a pass or fail basis, which determines whether or not 
the student will receive their ADAFCO certification.  Starting in January of 2012, the 
DMOC began recording the graded runs, so that the information would be available to 
course instructors, scenario developers, and system engineers for analysis. 
 
Scenario Overview 
JKCE is an integrated air missile defense scenario, which requires the ADAFCO 
students to respond to a myriad of enemy threats; Figure 2 below provides a simplified 
visual overview.  The friendly assets are green, enemy assets are red, and the blue 
represents a body of water.  There are more PATRIOT battalions, aircraft, and missiles in 
the actual scenario; however the figure below provides a basic outline.  Additionally, 
JKCE uses real-world terrain and locations; the figure below suffices while avoiding 
possible security classification issues. 
The CRC and PATRIOT battalions are located on one side of a border, with 
enemy TBM sites and SCUDs on the other.  Constructive simulators generate the TBM 
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and SCUD sites and launch missiles at pre-programmed intervals throughout the 
scenario.  A pair of PATRIOT emulators represents the two battalions, each equipped 
with a radio feed to the CRC.  This setup enables just one operator to simulate an entire 
PATRIOT battalion, which would normally require significantly more personnel.    
 
Figure 2: JKCE Scenario 
From the start of the scenario, there are both friendly and enemy fighter aircraft 
flying near the border areas.  The DMOC’s red air constructive simulator generates the 
enemy aircraft, which run autonomously on pre-programmed routes.  Another 
constructive simulator generates friendly aircraft, which are controlled by other active 
duty personnel or government contractors.  The scenario developers chose to require that 
personnel fly the friendly aircraft, so that the CRC crew would be able to perform their 
normal aircraft control function.  The CRC crew has no role when not communicating 
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with pilots, tracking, and directing aircraft.  This feature improves the event’s realism and 
enables the CRC crew to get practice during the event.  While the CRC crew does 
accomplish some of their own continuous training requirements in JKCE, the DMOC 
designed the scenario to train the ADAFCOs first and foremost. 
In the context of the scenario, the Air Force CRC crew performs aircraft 
command and control functions.  That is, they direct friendly aircraft to defend military 
bases against an onslaught of attacking enemy aircraft.  This provides the ADAFCO with 
the situational awareness necessary to prevent potential fratricide.  If the PATRIOT 
incorrectly classifies an aircraft, the ADAFCO is able to crosscheck with the CRC crew 
before giving an engagement order.  This engagement de-confliction is the anti-fratricide 
function alluded to in the previous section.  The CRC crew with the ADAFCO identifies 
aircraft and missiles as hostile or friendly, and then coordinates PATRIOT missile strikes 
as applicable.  The span between threat detection and engagement is called the kill chain, 
hence the event’s title. 
At its core, JKCE is an exercise in task saturation.  The ADAFCO must direct two 
PATRIOT battalions that are almost constantly engaging enemy aircraft and missiles 
throughout the scenario.  At the same time, they are de-conflicting targets with the CRC 
to ensure that the PATRIOT battalions don’t accidently engage friendly aircraft.  The 
radio chatter is almost nonstop, and the ADAFCO must quickly recognize and react to 
missile attacks, in order to succeed. 
 
Simulated vs. Live JKCE 
 The political and operational motives for the ADAFCO course and JKCE are 
23 
 
 
clear.  The military wants to avoid future PATRIOT-related fratricide because it is 
counterproductive to successful military operations and most importantly costs friendly 
lives.  Assuming that the Army now must provide formal ADAFCO training, the DMO 
environment offers many benefits over and above a live alternative. 
 The first benefit of a simulated JKCE is the high level of fidelity from the 
ADAFCO’s perspective.  As previously stated, in JKCE the ADAFCO operates from 
within a CRC simulator, which is identical to the live system.  The ADAFCO only 
interacts with radar systems, data link equipment, and radios all of which are relatively 
simple to emulate.  From their perspective, the scenario appears as it would in the real 
world, except that the CRC is located indoors rather than in the field.  This high-fidelity 
setup is expected to improve the operators’ acceptance of the training.  Additionally, this 
makes the difference between the simulated scenario and a theoretically identical live 
scenario negligible, except that the students know the simulation is not real.  The analyst 
can confidently assume that the ADAFCO’s performance in the simulation would mimic 
their performance in the same live situation. 
 Second, due to significant safety concerns JKCE is an infeasible scenario to 
conduct in a live environment.  As elaborated in the scenario overview section, the 
ADAFCO conducts multiple PATRIOT strikes against incoming enemy missiles and 
aircraft.  To recreate these effects in a live environment would require pilots to fly the 
enemy aircraft that the PATRIOT battalions are shooting down, as well firing missiles at 
the PATRIOTs and other friendly assets.  While an unsuccessful engagement could mean 
a failed run in the simulated environment, the same situation live would result in 
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destroying a PATRIOT battery and killing its crewmembers.  The military has not nor 
will ever engage in a training scenario with such significant risks and consequences.  
 Third, JKCE in a live environment is not feasible due the test range limitations.   
The scenario occurs in an area of about sixty thousand square miles.  As a comparison, 
the area of White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico is only about three thousand, two 
hundred square miles.  There are not any ranges in the United States large-enough to 
cover that area.   
 Fourth, executing JKCE in a live-fire environment would be incredibly expensive 
from a monetary standpoint.  According to a Department of Defense’s Selected 
Acquisition Report (2011) the unit cost of a single PATRIOT missile is approximately six 
million dollars.  Considering each ADAFCO student orders approximately twenty missile 
strikes during the course, in both practice and record runs, this drives the live cost of 
JKCE up to approximately two hundred million dollars for missiles alone.  That figure 
towers over the approximately forty thousand dollars in contractor support that it requires 
the DMOC to host a virtual JKCE. 
 Fifth, an all-live version of JKCE would create significant negative externalities 
in the form of noise and environmental pollution.  Both missile launches and fighter 
aircraft, which comprise a majority of the JKCE scenario, generate a significant amount 
of noise.  This exercise could impose negative externalities on citizens if the test range 
was not sufficiently isolated from local populations.  Additionally, live aircraft and 
missile strikes generate fire, smoke, and exhaust that can cause negative environmental 
impacts.  The military avoids these potential social costs by utilizing a virtual training 
environment. 
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 Assuming the execution of JKCE is a binding requirement for the military, DMO 
is strictly preferred to a live environment.  The simulated version offers near-live fidelity 
at significantly lower monetary and social costs.  Additionally, a live JKCE is infeasible 
due to test range limitations and basic safety considerations.   
 Simulation is clearly the preferred method for conducting JKCE from the cost 
standpoint; however one crucial question remains unaddressed.  Does JKCE or the 
ADAFCO course as a whole actually improve the operational performance of 
ADAFCOs?  Though not possible to analyze their wartime operational performance, it is 
assumed that JKCE replicates the challenges of actual warfare.  Each ADAFCO directs 
approximately twenty strikes in just an hour and a half of total simulator time during 
JKCE.  Remember that there were only eleven PATRIOT engagements during the first 
three months of OIF for the entire United States Army.  This high level of task saturation 
serves a stress test for the ADAFCOs prior to awarding their certification.  Therefore, 
improvements in JKCE performance should translate into improved real-world 
operational ability. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 This section includes a justification for the performance metrics and description 
of the data gathering process.  This study required the collection of an original dataset, 
using only the JKCE pre-recorded scenarios.  Previously, the DMOC only captured the 
number of students who completed the course.   
 
Performance Metrics 
 The first important metric is successful event completion, i.e. did the student pass 
JKCE?  This pass or fail criteria is based on whether or not the ADAFCO successfully 
defended all of the friendly assets.  To elaborate, the ADAFCO must successfully order 
defensive PATRIOT strikes against all of the oncoming enemy missiles.   
In the January 2012 event JKCE 12-1, every student accomplished the 
overarching air defense goal during record runs.  This pass rate may suggest that the 
scenario is too easy; however the scenario only needs to challenge students to the extent 
that it establishes the baseline performance necessary to serve as an ADAFCO.  From an 
institutional perspective, course completion equates to an ADAFCO certification and 
authority to hold that position.  Based on the expert opinions of the instructors and system 
experts that designed the event, JKCE successfully tests that baseline.   
It is possible that the high pass rate observed in JKCE 12-1 reflects selection bias 
or significant prior experience.  As former PATRIOT operators, the students could 
already be familiar with ADAFCO procedures and thus relatively unchallenged by the 
scenario.  Similarly, JKCE 12-1 may have just contained and abnormally large 
concentration of talented students.  These potential issues are discussed in more detail 
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later on. 
 The more descriptive performance metric, from an analytical perspective, is 
response time.  For the purpose of this analysis, response time is the time from the 
emergence of the enemy threat to the ADAFCO’s engagement order.  In other words, the 
time between the enemy’s missile launch and the ADAFCO’s “engage” command.  As 
previously stated, this is the time when the ADAFCO students are coordinating between 
the CRC crew, friendly aircraft, and PATRIOT battalions. 
 In the military, the ability to rapidly respond is essential, and this is especially true 
for ADAFCOs.  From a purely defensive perspective, a quicker response means that 
enemy aircraft and missiles are shot down further away from friendly assets.  In the case 
of a miss, this might mean that the PATRIOT battalions have enough time to fire a 
second shot at the target.  On the other hand, more time may also improve the 
ADAFCO’s anti-fratricide function.  PATRIOT operating procedures dictate mandatory 
system defense once an unidentified flyer enters within a certain distance.  The ADAFCO 
must positively identify aircraft before they cross the PATRIOT’s self-defense threshold, 
at which point the battalions will fire.  The PATRIOT operators will be forced to assume 
the potential target is hostile, if the ADAFCO cannot properly identify the target in time.  
Therefore, a quicker ADAFCO has relatively more time to investigate unknown and 
potentially misclassified threats.  For both general defense and anti-fratricide 
coordination a quicker response is a desirable trait. 
 The operational outcome of interest at the core of the ADAFCO course is reduced 
response time.  Therefore, one could evaluate the effectiveness of the ADAFCO course 
based on its ability to improve that response time.  Unlike many other military training 
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programs, this course could justify its existence by demonstrating tangible improvement 
of a desired operational skill, quicker ADAFCO response times. 
 
Four Level Analysis 
 Kirkpatrick (1998) developed a now widely utilized model for training program 
analysis.  This model evaluates training programs at the following four levels: reaction, 
learning, behavior, and results.  Reaction is a measure of operator acceptance or trainee 
satisfaction with the program.  Learning is an increase in the students’ knowledge or skill 
levels.  Behavior refers to changes in participants’ future actions as a result of training.  
Lastly, results are the final outcomes caused by the training. 
 This study does not directly measure the students’ reaction to training during 
JKCE or the ADAFCO course in general.  An end of course survey would be an easy way 
to incorporate this element into future analyses.  However, it is assumed that the students 
positively react to the ADAFCO course, given the alternative is no training at all.  The 
course provides students with at least some level of confidence and experience, before 
they serve as ADAFCOs in a wartime environment. 
 The next level for consideration is learning, which this analysis measures in two 
ways.  The first and more general measurement of operational learning is whether or not 
the student passed JKCE.  The second and more direct measurement is reaction time and 
more importantly improvements in reaction time.   
 The third level of evaluation concentrates on behavioral changes.  In the case of 
the ADAFCO course this is an easy criterion to meet.  After the course, the students will 
serve as ADAFCOs, which is a duty that they have not performed before.  The fact that 
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the students will assume a new position, with its own unique requirements, guarantees 
that they will display a behavioral change.  However, it would be difficult to determine 
whether the ADAFCO course or the job itself caused those behavioral changes. 
 The final level of training program analysis is results.  Currently, the course does 
not capture any final results.  However, one might measure course results with a follow-
up JKCE record run post-training.  For instance, former students could come back to the 
DMOC sometime after completing the ADAFCO course to retest their skills in JKCE.  
Then analysts could determine whether or not the course is creating lasting operational 
results, rather than temporary skill level improvements.  Ideally, the analyst would 
investigate results in an operational wartime environment.  However, gathering reaction 
time data in a deployed environment could be troublesome given the relatively low 
number of PATRIOT engagements, day-to-day unpredictability, and overall danger. 
 Due to data limitations and practicality issues, this analysis focuses on the 
learning level of evaluation.  More specifically, skill level improvement as demonstrated 
by reduced ADAFCO reaction time is the primary interest.  The following subsections 
describe the data collection process and experimental design used to evaluate the level of 
learning in the ADAFCO course. 
 
Data Collection 
 An application called the DMOC replay tool enables detailed analysis of the 
ADAFCO’s response time.  This tool allows an analyst to record all of the simulation 
traffic for a given event or test; in this case JKCE 12-1 in January of 2012 and JKCE 12-2 
in August 2012.  Aside from the simulated assets, i.e. missiles, planes, and PATRIOT 
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batteries, the replay tool also captures the radio conversations.  This allows the analyst to 
observe the virtual battle from a bird’s eye view, while listening to the radio chatter. 
 With the virtual events on the record, the next step is scenario familiarization.  
The students have basic intelligence on the enemy’s capabilities and know that they are 
entering a hostile environment, however they do not know the number or mix of threats 
they will face.  A full thirty-minute record run requires the students to identify, de-
conflict, and “engage” three questionable missile attacks.  Questionable means that these 
missiles are not easily classified and could be friendly aircraft, therefore PATRIOT 
engagement requires ADAFCO direction.  After identifying these three areas of interest 
the data collection began. 
 As discussed in the previous section, response time is the time between the 
enemy’s missile launch and the ADAFCOs “engage” command.  Using the DMOC 
replay tool, the analyst can visually observe and document enemy missile launches.  Then 
he or she must listen for the “engage” command and record the time accordingly.  The 
difference between these times is the response time performance metric.  
It may seem that the missile interception or detonation would serve as a better end 
point for the response time.  However, the ADAFCO students are the targeted training 
audience and not the PATRIOT operators.  The “engage” command more accurately 
captures the completion of the ADAFCO’s task, because the missile launch is then in the 
hands of the PATRIOT operators.  This approach avoids potential measurement errors 
that the PATRIOT battalions could cause with varying reaction times.  If the goal were to 
test and analyze the entire kill chain, then it would make sense to use missile launch or 
detonation as a stopping point.  However, it would then be necessary to utilize fully 
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manned PATRIOT battalions and batteries, rather than the simplified JKCE set-up.  
While this theoretical training scenario may have merit, it is not the most efficient way to 
accomplish the current goals of the ADAFCO course.  The “engage” command best 
captures ADAFCO response time, which is the performance metric of interest. 
This manual recording process likely introduces some human measurement error 
into the data.  For instance, it is possible that the data became more precise over time as 
measurement technique improved.  However, that error is probably less than one or two 
seconds.  As demonstrated in the following sections, errors of such small magnitude 
would not change the recommendations presented in this analysis. 
 
Preliminary Experimental Design (JKCE 12-1) 
Due to the aforementioned data constraints, the preliminary analysis of the 
ADAFCO course follows a basic one-group posttest-only quasi-experimental design, 
represented in Table 1 below.  That is, there is one group of test subjects who all receive 
treatment (ADAFCO course), and all subjects receive a single test after that treatment 
(the JKCE).  The absence of random assignment makes this a quasi-experiment, because 
there is nothing random about ADAFCO students’ assignment to the course.  In addition, 
as Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) write “the absence of a pretest makes it difficult 
to know if a change has occurred, and the absence of a no-treatment control group makes 
it difficult to know what would have happened without treatment” (p. 106).  This 
statement is a significant strike against evaluation of the current course’s relevancy and 
effectiveness. 
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Table 1: JKCE 12-1 Experimental Design 
It is arguable that the students could not successfully complete JKCE without 
training, which is the didactic portion of the ADAFCO course.  Therefore, the fact that all 
thirteen students passed JKCE 12-1 might constitute a skill-level improvement.  The 
problem with this argument is that most of the students are familiar with the ADAFCO 
duties and have likely worked with one in past assignments.  There is a chance that some 
of the more-talented students could make it through the scenario without the course.  For 
this reason, successful event completion alone is not a sufficient argument for the 
course’s effectiveness.  JKCE sets a baseline for the students’ operational skills, but 
cannot really validate any improvement of said skills as a result of the ADAFCO course.  
Some sort of pretest is necessary to measure improvement in the students’ skill level or 
responsiveness.  
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RESULTS 
This section presents the results from the overall analysis, based on data from 
JKCE 12-1 and 12-2.  The preliminary analysis, JKCE 12-1, faced significant limitations, 
but laid groundwork for a more in-depth follow on study.  Despite the constraints, the 
preliminary analysis served as a proof of concept for gathering operationally relevant 
performance metrics in DMO training events.  The secondary analysis focused on JKCE 
12-2 and benefited from previous lessons learned.  Merging the data from both exercises 
enabled a more robust analysis with recommendations for future course configuration. 
 
Preliminary Results (JKCE 12-1) 
 The results of the JKCE 12-1 analysis are available in Appendix A, while Table 2 
below contains some basic summary statistics.  The table lists average response time 
across students and the corresponding standard deviations for each of the three enemy 
missile threats.  The table in Appendix A displays the complete dataset, and contains each 
student’s response time by threat.  The grey sections of that table indicate that a particular 
student did not face the corresponding threat.  This happened because students either 
started late after certain threats already launched or finished the scenario prematurely.  
Testing inconsistency is a topic of discussion in the following subsection, because all 
students should have encountered the same mix of threats. 
 As seen in the table below, the data is compiled by individual threats.  This 
method is preferred to lumping all three reaction times together into a single composite 
score for each student.  As stated above, testing inconsistency was a problem during 
JKCE 12-1.  Therefore, only response times with respect to a single threat are 
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comparable.  Assigning composite scores to students that only faced one or two threats 
would introduce bias.  In order to avoid this issue, the threat-based sample calculations 
simply exclude the empty values. 
 
Table 2: JKCE 12-1 Reaction Times 
As previously stated, this was the first iteration of JKCE that utilized the replay 
tool, but unfortunately the DMOC only recorded the graded runs.  Therefore, it is not 
possible to examine the statistical relationship between the students performance in their 
practice versus record runs.  Despite the data limitations, this analysis retains importance 
as a proof of concept.  It demonstrated that, given an event recording exists, measuring 
the students’ response times is relatively straightforward.  Furthermore, this analysis 
established a foundation for the follow-up effectiveness study discussed later. 
 
Preliminary Observations (JKCE 12-1) 
 The preliminary JKCE analysis revealed two obvious areas for improvement.  
First, the instructors inconsistently tested students, despite the use of a standardized 
scenario.  Second, course directors administer the practice scenario too closely to the 
record run, given the scenarios are identical. 
  Testing consistency is the first obvious area for improvement.  As demonstrated 
by the grey cells in Appendix A, not all of the students took the “full” test.  In the 
extreme example, a student didn’t have to react to a single questionable threat, while 
others responded to all three.  This inconsistency damages the credibility of the course, 
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particularly when graduating means that the student is qualified to serve as an ADAFCO. 
According to Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) “casual inference from any 
quasi-experiment must meet the basic requirements for all causal relationships: that cause 
precede effect, that cause covary with effect, and that alternative explanations for the 
causal relationship are implausible” (p. 105).  For the ADAFCO course, only the first 
requirement is easy to achieve.  The ADAFCO course or “cause” does precede the 
implied effect of improved performance during JKCE.   
The second criterion is somewhat more troublesome, because at this time it is 
unknown whether or not the cause and effect co-vary.  The cause or didactic instruction 
does co-vary with the effect of passing JKCE.  However, as previously stated it is 
undetermined whether or not the students could succeed in JKCE without any instruction, 
i.e. the ADAFCO course.  If the ADAFCO course improves JKCE performance in a 
statistically significant way, then this condition will hold.   
The third requirement is also difficult to satisfy, because there are plausible 
threats to internal validity.  The primary threat here is the practice effect, particularly 
given the shortness of the event.  The time difference between the practice and record 
runs is only about two days, and the scenario is exactly the same.  Letting students 
practice the test only a day or two before they take it for a grade is questionable.  Practice 
effects are expected given this course configuration.  The didactic portion of the 
ADAFCO course cannot claim any performance difference between the two runs, 
because the treatment precedes both tests. 
During the initial review of the JKCE 12-1 recordings there was only data 
available on the actual test or record run.  Therefore a detailed investigation of potential 
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practice effects was not possible.  However, in the follow-up analysis of JKCE 12-2, the 
DMOC recorded both the practice and graded runs.  This enables identification of 
performance differences between the two runs. 
 
Secondary Analysis (JKCE 12-2) 
In order to investigate practice effects and provide further course improvement 
recommendations, a follow-up analysis was conducted after JKCE 12-2 in August 2012.  
The performance metrics and data gathering mirror the initial analysis, except that the 
experimental design now includes two posttests as shown in Table 3 below.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to pair an individual student’s practice and record run 
results, because the recording files do not contain the student names. 
 
Table 3: JKCE 12-2 Experimental Design 
The new experimental design and accompanying dataset, Appendix B, offers the 
first detailed look at practice effects in JKCE.  As shown in Appendix B, all but one of 
the students has at least one “HIT” during their practice run.  “HIT” means that the 
student failed to give the engagement command before the enemy missile impacted its 
target.  That means that all but one student would have failed JKCE if they were tested 
for a grade directly after the classroom training.   
 In order to create a more robust dataset, a reaction time equal to the time between 
launch and impact is assigned to the hits.  This methodology actually causes downward 
bias, because only a few students were on the brink of an engagement command when the 
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missiles impacted.  Therefore, a majority of the students would have even longer reaction 
time then the maximums that they were assigned.  Table 4 below presents summary 
statistics from the JKCE 12-2 analysis. 
 
Table 4: JKCE 12-2 Reaction Times 
The practice run itself appears to spur an improvement in student performance 
from a reaction time standpoint.  A simple regression model sheds light on the magnitude 
of these improvements.  As shown, the dummy variable is set to zero for a practice run 
and one for a record run. 
 
Equation 1: Regression Model 
Because the dependent variable only assumes two values, one or zero, the best-fit 
line runs through the reaction time means for the practice and record runs.  Hence, the 
intercepts shown in Table 5 below correspond to sample means for the JKCE 12-2 
practice runs.  The slopes are the differences between the record and practice run sample 
means.  Consider Threat 1 for instance, the model predicts that a student’s record run 
reaction time will be just over three minutes faster than their practice run reaction time.  
However, data restrictions limit the power of this model, because other presumably 
important performance factors like individual skill level or prior experience are not 
included.  
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Table 5: Regression Analysis 
 Approximately forty-seven percent of the assessed enemy threats leaked through 
during the JKCE 12-2 practice runs.  This appears to be evidence to the contrary of the 
statement that some high-skilled students could pass JKCE even without didactic portion 
of the ADAFCO course.  However, it is possible that the poor performance is the result of 
selection bias.  For instance, the students in JKCE 12-2 might be an unusually untalented 
group, but this theory is unlikely given the selective nature of the ADAFCO career field.  
Officers are chosen for the ADAFCO course because they have shown proficiency in 
previous positions.  Seemingly, this reduces the likelihood of sampling errors. 
 Table 6 presents the averages and standard deviations for the JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 
record runs side by side.  If anything, this data suggests that the JKCE 12-2 students were 
a relatively talented group, at least when compared to the JKCE 12-1.  The fact that the 
entire JKCE 12-2 class failed their practice runs cannot be attributed to a difference in 
skill level between the JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 samples.  Based on the data available, it is 
likely that the JKCE 12-1 class also struggled with the practice scenario.  Unfortunately, 
there is no data available to confirm that assertion. 
 
Table 6: JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 Record Run Reaction Times 
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The more likely explanation for the unfavorable practice performance is that the 
classroom-based portion of the ADAFCO course does little to increase the operational 
skills of the students.  If the goal of course is to improve the operational capacity of the 
ADAFCOs and JKCE is a legitimate assessment of that capacity, then the didactic 
portion of the course should foster favorable performance in JKCE.  However, the 
classroom learning alone appears inadequate to garner the baseline of JKCE success. 
Table 7 below shows the sample averages and standard deviations for all of the 
available practice and record runs.  To be clear the practice sample only consists of JKCE 
12-2 data, while the record run sample captures the JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 results.  Clearly 
the record run sample demonstrates improved performance when compared to the 
practice run sample.  Nevertheless, additional hypothesis testing is used to expand the 
evidence of practice effects. 
 
Table 7: All Practice and Record Run Reaction Times 
 A hypothesis test is constructed to test differences between two population means, 
practice versus record runs, with unknown population standard deviations (Anderson, 
Sweeney, & Williams, 2009, p. 403).  The null hypothesis is the practice run population 
mean for a single threat minus the record run population mean for the same threat is less 
than or equal to zero.  A failure to reject the null hypothesis means there is not a 
statistically significant difference between the practice and record run population means, 
or worse that the practice scores might actually be better.  The alternative hypothesis is 
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the practice run population mean for a single threat minus the record run population mean 
for the same threat is greater than zero.  Thus rejecting the null hypothesis, suggests there 
is a statistically significant and positive difference between the practice and record runs, 
and the record run reaction times are better. 
 
Equation 2: Hypothesis Test 
With the test hypotheses in place, the next step is generation of test statistics and 
corresponding degrees of freedom.  The general equations and results are included in 
Appendix D, while just the individual degrees of freedom, test statistics, and p-values are 
presented in Table 8 below.  All three tests, one for each threat, are upper-tailed tests with 
positive rejection regions.  As shown below, the outcome is to reject the null hypothesis 
in all three cases with over ninety-nine percent confidence. 
 
Table 8: Test Statistics 
 The results of the secondary JKCE analysis suggest that there is a statistically 
significant and positive difference between the ADAFCO students’ practice and record 
run performance.  To simplify, the students display quicker reaction times in the graded 
scenario runs than the practice runs.  This supports the claim that the current ADAFCO 
course configuration elicits significant practice effects. 
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The classroom-based portion of the course cannot logically cause this 
performance improvement, because both events occur afterwards.  The claim that the 
didactic portion of the course trains students to operate as ADAFCOs and further that 
successful completion of JKCE certifies that ability is false.  The more likely explanation, 
is that the students pass JKCE because they perform a practice test, identical to their 
graded test, only a day or two beforehand.  Based on the data collected, one expects that 
most students would fail JKCE if not for the practice runs.  While this discredits the 
ADAFCO course’s current configuration, the results of this analysis are actually quite 
positive.   
As previously stated, the goal of the course is to improve the operational 
capability of soon to be ADAFCOs.  The JKCE scenario establishes a baseline for that 
operational capability, under the assumption that students who successfully complete the 
scenario are good enough to serve as ADAFCOs.  While the didactic portion of the 
course appears incapable of achieving this baseline, simulated operational training in the 
form of practice runs rendered statistically significant performance increases.  An 
increase in simulated training could spur further improvements to the students’ 
operational skills. 
 
Course Configuration 
 Restructuring the ADAFCO course is a worthwhile endeavor given the didactic 
element’s inability to generate the desired operational result that is, passing JKCE.  This 
is important, because tax revenue funds the ADAFCO course like all other military 
endeavors.  The military must wisely and responsibly use those funds to create and 
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improve war-fighting capabilities.  The ADAFCO position and accompanying skill set is 
indeed a legitimate military requirement.  However, ADAFCO training must be designed 
with the development and improvement of operational capabilities as the top priorities. 
 The first step in reconfiguration is evaluating the didactic portion of the course.  
The course instructors have some purely knowledge-based objectives not directly tested 
by JKCE, which are still highlighted as ADAFCO course learning objectives.  They must 
concentrate on teaching and testing that information within the classroom-based portion 
of the course.  Additionally, if the academic test scores were available to researchers it 
would enable a more robust course analysis. 
With all the relevant learning objectives identified, both operational skills and 
general knowledge, one can start experimenting with different course configurations.  
Table 9 below presents a two-by-two factorial design created to examine alternatives.  
This experimental design varies two factors, which are the amount of didactic and 
simulator training.  Additionally, each factor contains two levels measured by duration in 
weeks.  For simplification, the two levels of measurement are one and two weeks.  
However, these levels could be adjusted to different lengths of time, given this design is 
just an example.  Similarly, additional levels of measurement could be added, which 
would provide for a more detailed analysis. 
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Table 9: Course Reconfiguration 2x2 Factorial Design 
The ADAFCO course directors could implement this experimental design in two 
different ways.  First, they could randomize an entire class into different treatments.  
Second, they could assign an entire class to one of the new types of treatment.  The latter 
is the more practical option, given the small class size and students’ potential fairness 
concerns.  If a single class of only twelve students was divided into four treatments that 
would only provide three-student sample sizes.  There is a high risk that sampling 
variance might exaggerate the differences between treatments.  Additionally, some 
students might think that the course is unfair given they are not receiving the same 
treatment as their classmates, but they all take the same tests.  While the economist is not 
necessarily concerned with fairness, the students would have a legitimate complaint if the 
treatments produced differing levels of operational readiness. 
Regardless of how the course directors implement the experiment, they must 
restructure the classroom academics, so that all of the general knowledge objectives can 
be addressed in just one week.  Reducing the didactic portion requires the shortening or 
even deletion of certain learning blocks.  This task is necessary in order to explore the 
condensed course and reduced academics with additional simulation alternatives. 
Expanding the simulation portion of the course is a much simpler task, assuming 
simulator availability.  At twelve students per course and the current rate of 
approximately twelve thirty-minute runs per day, each student receives an additional five 
practice runs in a week.  This is necessary for the current configuration with additional 
simulation and reduced academics with additional simulation alternatives.  With these 
configurations each practice run serves as both a treatment and measurement point.  One 
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major benefit of this design is the increased number of operational performance 
measurement points. 
 Decreasing marginal returns to scale are expected to appear with the additional 
simulator training.  That is, reaction times are expected to improve by narrowing margins 
as the students approach a theoretical performance maximum.  For instance, it is possible 
that the students’ performance improves throughout the first four simulator runs but then 
levels off for the final three runs.  This may be reason to eventually scale back the 
simulator practice and either shorten the course or add back some didactic training.   
 Introducing additional data analysts might also be beneficial, as that one or two 
seconds of human measurement error may become relevant on the margin.  To alleviate 
this problem, course planners could add one or two data analysts and then use the average 
reaction time measurement across analysts.  This should help reduce the measurement 
error and provide more precise datasets. 
 The overarching goal of the course remains improvement of the ADAFCOs’ 
operational performance, and this experiment is designed with that in mind.  To achieve 
this goal, the experiment introduces three new ADAFCO course treatments.  The 
recommendation is that the instructors test the three alternative course designs during the 
next three iterations of the course.  Finally, they can use the new data to further improve 
the course.  
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CONCLUSION 
 During the beginning stages of the War in Iraq, the PATRIOT weapon system 
committed two incidents of fratricide resulting in three friendly deaths and two lost 
aircraft.  In response to these incidents, the military formed a working group to 
investigate the underlying causes and recommend future courses of action.  One policy 
that stemmed from this was the creation of a formal ADAFCO training course. 
 The goal of the course is to train and certify ADAFCOs for their role in major 
combat operations.  The capstone event in the ADAFCO course is an operationally 
focused DMO exercise called JKCE.  During this event, the ADAFCO operates from 
within an Air Force CRC and directs two simulated PATRIOT battalions to fire against a 
myriad of enemy threats. 
 The DMO-based scenario is strongly preferred to a theoretical live version of the 
exercise for various reasons.  The first benefit is that the CRC simulator is identical to the 
live equipment it emulates.  From the training audience’s perspective the scenario 
appears as it would in the real world.  Next, a live version of JKCE is simply infeasible 
due to test range limitations and safety concerns.  Finally, the simulated event carries 
significantly lower monetary and social costs. 
 The Department of Defense faces considerable budget cuts in years to come.  The 
goal is saving money while preserving war-fighting capability.  One possible avenue for 
savings is shifting from live to simulated training through DMO.  However, it is not 
acceptable to simply reduce costs by substituting simulation for live training while 
ignoring program effectiveness.  Both live and simulated training events must be 
objectively analyzed on the basis of effectiveness.  The goal of military training is to 
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improve the operational capability of soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors. 
 JKCE was used as a case study to explore training effectiveness analysis and 
ADAFCO reaction times for three engagements common to JKCE 12-1 and 12-2 
comprise the study’s dataset.  The didactic portion of the ADAFCO course proved 
inadequate to achieve the baseline level of operational performance necessary to pass 
JKCE.  In fact, the only element of the course that demonstrated a measurable and 
statistically significant improvement in ADAFCO response time was the practice run in 
the simulator.   
 These findings are crucial to improving future iterations of ADAFCO training.  
This analysis suggests that the course might be more effective if more time was spent in 
the simulator practicing operational skills.  With this in mind, I presented a 
recommendation to explore course reconfiguration. 
 The recommended experimental model provides three alternatives for course 
reconfiguration.  This set up enables the ADAFCO course directors to test different 
training designs, while still achieving their basic training objectives.  After using this 
experimental design to gather additional data, the course can be readjusted for the sake of 
optimization. 
The ultimate objective of improving operational skills in wartime must be kept in 
mind when designing training programs, whether they occur in a live or DMO 
environment.  Additionally, in an era of fiscal constraint training programs will face more 
pressure to justify their existence by demonstrating improvements to operational 
capabilities.  This thesis provides a blueprint for how military decision-makers might 
approach future evaluations of training program.  
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ACRONYMS 
ADA - Air Defense Artillery 
ADAFCO - Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers 
ARM - Anti-Radiation Missile 
AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System 
CEA - Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
CRC - Control and Reporting Center 
C2 - Command and Control 
DMO - Distributed Mission Operations 
DMOC - Distributed Mission Operations Center 
JKCE - Joint Kill Chain Event 
OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom 
PATRIOT - Phased Array Tracking Intercept of Target 
TBM - Theatre Ballistic Missile 
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Appendix A: JKCE 12-1 Collected Data 
 
* This table contains all recorded data for JKCE 12-1 presented in five-digit times.  The 
differences between detection times and engagement times (reaction times) are also 
included. 
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Appendix B: JKCE 12-2 Collected Data 
 
* This table contains all recorded data for JKCE 12-2 presented in five-digit times.  The 
differences between detection times and engagement times (reaction times) are also 
included. 
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Appendix C: Reaction Times  
 
* This table contains all recorded reaction times, JKCE 12-1 and 12-2, converted from six 
digit times to seconds.  The times are separated by run type, practice versus record, as 
well as threat.  Sample means and sample standard deviations are also included. 
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Appendix D: Equations and Test Statistics 
Hypothesis Tests 
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Test Statistics 
 
Results 
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